

Message Text

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TAGS: PARM, US, UR

SUBJECT: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS

TTBT/PNE MESSAGE NUMBER THIRTY

1. THIS IS A REORT ON LUNCHEON DISCUSSION STOESEL-BUCHHEIM-TUNIK WITH MOROKHOV-TIMERBAEV-ASHTALOV ON FRIDAY, MARCH 7.
2. MOROKHOV STARTED BY SAYING SOVIET SIDE HAS NOW PRESENTED ITS BASIC POSITION ON YIELD LEVELS AND HE WONDERED WHAT US REPLY WILL BE. STOESEL SAID TALKS WERE CONSTRUCTIVE, BUT THAT WE COULD NOT COME TO AGREEMENT ON YIELD LEVELS WITHOUT ALSO SETTING VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS BECAUSE THEY AFFECT ONE ANOTHER. STOESEL ALSO MENTIONED THAT THERE WERE OTHER ELEMENTS OF US PROPOSALS TO WHICH SOVIET SIDE HAS MADE NO REPLY, PARTICULARLY LIMITATIONS ON FISSION YIELD AND MINIMUM DEPTH-OF-BURIAL FOR EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS. MOROKHOV SAID ALL OF THESE THINGS WOULD BE DISCUSSED.
3. BUCHHEIM ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF REMARKS OF MOROKHOV AT THURSDAY (MARCH 6) PLENARY IN WHICH HE SEEMED TO SAY THAT FISSION YIELD AND DEPTH LIMITATINS WERE ELEMENTS OF VERIFICATION TO BE DISCUSSED LATER. MOROKHOV SAID YES, THAT IS WHAT HE SAID. HE SAID SOVIET SIDE FULLY UNDERSTANDS THE REASONS FOR US PROPOSAL OF THESE TWO LIMITATIONS AND THEY AGREE WITH THEM. THE 0.2 KILOTON LIMIT IS NO PROBLEM. THE DEPTH CONDITION IS ALSO NOT A PROBLEM;

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IN FACT THEY COULD OFFER A DEEPER MINIMUM DEPTH IF WE WISHED.

HE SAID THEIR ONLY PROBLEM IS THAT THEY HAVE NOT YET COMPLETED THEIR ANALYSIS OF METHODS FOR VERIFYING FISSION YIELD AND THE PRECISION THAT MIGHT BE REALIZED. HE SAID WE COULD PROCEED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WILL ACCEPT THESE TWO LIMITATIONS BUT WILL NEED TO COMPLETE ITS STUDY OF FISSION-YIELD VERIFICATION BEFORE DISCUSSING THAT ASPECT. MOROKHOV, JOINED BY TIMERBAEV, SAID SOVIET SIDE WANTED TO KNOW WHAT ORDER OF UNCERTAINTY MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN FISSION-YIELD DETERMINATION SO NO "SQUABBLES" WOULD RESULT IN PRACTICE. WITHIN A FACTOR OF TWO? BUCHHEIM SAID US SIDE EXPECTED PRECISION TO BE ADEQUATE FOR THE PURPOSE BEHIND THE PROPOSAL FOR THIS LIMITATION. STOESSEL POINTED OUT THAT THE TTBT DOES NOT SPECIFY A PRECISION ON DETERMINATION OF 150 KILOTON LIMITATION. TIMERBAEV NOTED THAT TTBT IS ALSO NOT IN EFFECT YET, SO WE HAVE NO EXPERIENCE ON HOW IT WILL WORK. HE WONDERED IF IT WOULD BE BETTER TO SPECIFY A RANGE OF ACCEPTABLE FISSION YIELD RATHER THAN A SINGLE NUMBER.

4. STOESSEL RETURNED TO MATTER OF YIELD LIMITS PROPOSED BY SOVIETS AND NEED TO CONSIDER VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS AT SAME TIME. MOROKHOV SAID SOVIET SIDE HAD WORKED HARD TO SET FORTH YIELD LIMITATIONS CLOSER TO US PROPOSED FIGURES THAN THOSE CONSIDERED TO BE NECESSARY BY THEIR EXPERTS FOR VARIOUS APPLICATIONS. HE SAID INSTITUTE OF GEOLOGY IS VERY UPSET BY PROPOSAL FOR 150 KILOTONS LIMIT ON CONTAINED INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS BECAUSE THIS WOULD MEAN USING TWO EXPLOSIONS INSTEAD OF ONE FOR GEOTHERMAL APPLICATIONS WITH AN ASSOCIATED COST INCREASE BY A FACTOR OF 1.7. BUCHHEIM ASKED WHERE THE SOVIET SIDE NOW STANDS ON THE IDEA OF ALLOWING A LIMITED NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL CONTAINED EXPLOSIONS OVER 150 KILOTONS. MOROKHOV SAID THAT US SIDE HAS ARGUED THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO VERIFY THAT A CONTAINED EXPLOSION OVER 150 KILOTONS IS NOT A WEAPON TEST. HE SAID SOVIET EXPERTS HAVE EXAMINED THIS POINT CAREFULLY AND COME TO AGREEMENT WITH ARGUMENT OF US SIDE; THEREFORE, THEY PROPOSE THAT NO CONTAINED INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS BE ALLOWED OVER 150 KILOTONS.

5. MOROKHOV TURNED TO QUESTION OF VERIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL CONTAINED EXPLOSIONS BELOW 50-70 KILOTONS. HE SAID IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO ASK FOR NO MORE THAN NECESSARY INFORMATION ON SUCH SHOTS BECAUSE IT IS CLEAR THAT VERIFICATION MEANS WITHOUT GEOLOGICAL DATA, ETC., CAN ASSURE "WITHIN 90 PERCENT CONFIDENCE"

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THAT SHOTS BELOW 50-70 KILOTONS ARE NOT ACTUALLY LARGER THAN 150 KILOTONS. MOROKHOV SAID THAT FOR SHOTS BELOW 50-70 KILOTONS (HE SAID 50 KILOTONS, BUT TIMERBAEV CORRECTED HIM TO SAY 50-70 KILOTONS) SOVIET SIDE WOULD PROVIDE INFORMATION IN ADVANCE ON PLACE, DATE, TIME AND YIELD. STOESSEL ASKED: AND PURPOSE? MOROKHOV SAID: YES, AND PURPOSE.

6. CONTINUING, MOROKHOV SAID THAT OTHER DATA, GEOLOGICAL, ETC.,

WOULD BE PROVIDED FOR SHOTS ABOVE THE 50-70 KILOTONS LEVEL UP TO 100 KILOTONS. FOR SHOTS ABOVE 100 KILOTONS UP TO 150 KILOTONS "EXTENSIVE AND VERY DETAILED INFORMATION" WOULD BE PROVIDED ON EACH PROJECT. STOESSEL ASKED: AND OBSERVERS? BEFORE MOROKHOV COULD REPLY, TIMERBAEV INTERRUPTED AND SAID WE SHOULD DRINK A TOAST BEFORE TRYING TO ANSWER SUCH A QUESTION.

7. MOROKHOV THEN SAID THAT QUESTION OF OBSERVERS IS A "TROUBLE-SOME" ONE (SOVIET INTERPRETER SAID "PAINCAUSING"). HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT OBSERVERS ARE IMPOSSIBLE OUTSIDE A FRAMEWORK OF CO-OPERATION. WITH SUCH A FRAMEWORK THEY ARE POSSIBLE, PERHAPS.

8. MOROKHOV COMMENTED, WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ANYTHING, THAT SOVIET SIDE CANNOT CONTROL WHAT ITS EXPERTS SAY IN PLENARY AND THAT THEY ASSUMED US SIDE COULD NOT DO SO EITHER.

9. STOESSEL MENTIONED THAT US SIDE STILL EXPECTED A STATEMENT FROM SOVIET SIDE ON HOW INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS IN A CONTAINED GROUP EXPLOSION COULD BE INDIVIDUALLY DISTINGUISHED AND MEASURED. MOROKHOV SAID THAT IS SOMETHING FOR THE EXPERTS TO DISCUSS. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT SOVIET EXPERTS TELL HIM THAT WITH SEISMIC INSTRUMENTS PROPERLY EMPLACED RELATIVE TO THE GROUP EXPLOSION IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO COUNT THE NUMBER OF EXPLOSIONS IN THE GROUP. BUCHHEIM SAID THAT US SIDE WOULD PROBABLY AGREE WITH THAT, BUT HOW ABOUT MEASUREMENT OF YIELDS OF INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS? MOROKHOV SAID MEASUREMENTS COULD BE ACCURATE ENOUGH TO TELL IF ANY ONE EXPLOSION IN THE GROUP WAS LARGER THAN 150 KILOTONS. BUCHHEIM SAID US SIDE PROBABLY DOES NOT AGREE WITH THAT, BUT COULD THE EXPERTS BEGIN EXAMINATION OF THIS MATTER ON MONDAY? MOROKHOV SAID: PERHAPS, BUT WE WANT TO HEAR YOUR REPLY TO OUR TO OUR PROPOSED YIELD LIMITS.

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10. MOROKHOV THEN REMARKED THAT DETERMINATION OF YIELDS IS EASIER FOR A GROUP EXCAVATION EXPLOSION BECAUSE INFORMATION ON GEOLGOY, ETC., COMBINED WITH CRATER DIMENSIONS WOULD BE AVAILABLE. BUCHHEIM ASKED: AND INFORMATIN ON DEPTH? MOROKHOV SAID: YES, DEPTH.

11. MOROKHOV TURNED TO COOPERATION AGAIN, IN NO EVIDENT CONTEXT. STOESSEL REMARKED THAT US VIEW IS THAT AN AGREEMENT IS NEEDED ON EXPLICIT PROVISIONS FOR LIMITATIONS AND VERIFICATIONS IN A DOCUMENT WITH A LEGAL STATUS APPROPRIATE TO IMPLEMENTATION OF TTBT ARTICLE III. GIVEN THAT, WE DO NOT EXCLUDE COOPERATION. MOROKHOV AND TIMERBAEV BOTH REMARKED ON THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF PROVISIONS FOR COOPERATION EVEN IF THE TERMS ARE GENERAL RATHER THAN SPECIFIC.

12. MOROKHOV AGAIN ASKED FOR ANY COMMENT ON YIELD LEVELS PROPOSED BY SOVIET SIDE. BUCHHEIM SAID THAT THEY WERE VERY HIGH. MOROKHOV ASKED FOR AN EXAMPLE. BUCHHEIM SAID SOVIET SIDE PROPOSED TO ALLOW AN UNLIMITED YIELD IN EXCAVATION SALVOS AND THAT IS PRETTY HIGH. TIMERBAEV SAID THAT SOVIET PROPOSALS REPRESENT LARGE STEPS DOWNWARD FROM YIELDS ESTIMATED TO BE NEEDED BY MYASNIKOV AND RODIONOV, AND THAT IF MYASNIKOV AND RODIONOV TALK TOO FREELY WITH THEIR COLLEAGUES ABOUT WHAT MOROKHOV IS PROPOSING THERE WILL BE "A SCANDAL." MOROKHOV WENT ON TO SAY THAT THREE REPORTS OF EXPERTS PREPARED IN VIENNA SHOW AGREEMENT THAT SALVOS OF 10 MEGATONS ARE NEEDED FOR EXCAVATION. STOESSEL ASKED SECRET

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IF SOVIET SIDE, THEN, COULD AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO SOME SALVO LIMIT, EVEN ONE AS HIGH AS 10 MEGATONS? MOROKHOV REPLIED THAT SUCH A LIMIT WOULD BE MEANINGLESS. WHAT DIFFERENCE WOULD IT MAKE IF IT WERE 5 MEGATONS, 10 MEGATONS, OR 20 MEGATONS?

13. TIMERBAEV ASKED IF IT WOULD REALLY BE NECESSARY TO MENTION THE FISSION YIELD LIMIT IN AN AGREEMENT. BUCHHEIM REPLIED THAT THIS LIMITATION IS ESSENTIAL IF ANY YIELD LIMITS LIKE THOSE PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE ARE EVEN TO BE DISCUSSED SERIOUSLY. TIMERBAEV SAID THAT HIS CONCERN IS HOW TO EXPLAIN THIS LIMITATION TO THIRD COUNTRIES. COULD THEY SAY THAT IF THEY DEVELOPED AN EXPLOSIVE WITH ONLY 0.2 KILOTON FISSION YIELD THEN THEY HAVE A PNE BUT NO WEAPON? BUCHHEIM SAID THIS IS AN IMPORTANT QUESTION THAT WOULD NEED TO BE ATTENDED TO,BUT THAT US PROPOSALS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE ADDRESSED ONLY TO NEEDS FOR MEETING THE CRITERIA WE HAVE SET FOR A BILAERAL AGREEMENT TO IMPLEMENT TTBT ARTICLE III. STOESSEL OBSERVED THAT ONE WAY TO AVOID ALL SUCH PROBLEMS OF EXPLANATION IS NOT TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT ALLOWING PNES

AND NOT TO ALLOW ANY PNEs.

14. STOESEL THEN POINTED OUT THAT PROPOSALS OF US SIDE ON LIMITATIONS AND VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS WERE ADDRESSED SOLELY TO SATISFACTION OF THE FIRST TWO OF OUR THREE CRITERIA (REPEATING THESE FIRST TWO). AFTER A PAUSE, TIMERBAEV ASKED IF THE THIRD CRITERION SEEMED TO INVOLVE ANY PROBLEMS. STOESEL SAID IT MIGHT. MOROKHOV ASKED WHEN WE MIGHT GET INTO THAT SUBJECT. STOESEL SAID THAT US SIDE HAS NOTHING TO SAY ON IT NOW. MOROKHOV SAID THAT THE AGREEMENT SHOULD REAFFIRM ALL EXISTING TREATIES THAT APPLY AND HE KNOWS OF ONLY THREE: THE LTBT OF 1963, THE NPT, AND THE TTBT OF JULY 1974. TIMERBAEV SAID THAT PERHAPS IN DRAFTING AN AGREEMENT WE COULD EXPLAIN THE FISSION-YIELD LIMIT WITH SOME REFERENCE TO COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING TREATIES AND MEDICAL SAFETY FACTORS. BUCHHEIM SAID THAT THERE MAY BE A COINCIDENCE BETWEEN MEDICAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS AND THE FISSION-YIELD LIMITATION PROPOSED BY THE US SIDE, BUT IT WOULD NOT BE TRUE TO SAY THAT US PROPOSAL IS BASED ON MEDICAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS.

15. TIMERBAEV COMMENTED THAT SOVIET SIDE WOULD EXPECT THAT ANY INFORMATION EXCHANGED IN ADVANCE OF A PNE WOULD BE HELD CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL THE EXPLOSION IS OVER. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE WEAPON TEST THRESHOLD IN THE TTBT MAY GO DOWN IN THE FUTURE. HOWEVER,
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PNE LIMITS SHOULD NOT GO DOWN, ALTHOUGH THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION MADE AVAILABLE SHOULD INCREASE IF THE TTBT LIMITS GO DOWN.

16. TIMERBAEV ASKED WHEN WE MIGHT GET INTO SOME WORK ON SKETCHING OUT SOME LANGUAGE ON PARTS OF AN AGREEMENT OR EXPLORING A FORMAT. STOESEL SAID US SIDE WOULD LIKE TO MOVE ALONG AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE AND SUGGESTED THAT MEETINGS COULD BE MORE FREQUENT, REITERATING NEED TO DISCUSS LIMITATIONS AND VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS TOGETHER. TIMERBAEV PURSUED THE MATTER OF DRAFTING, SUGGESTING A SIMPLE TEXT MENTIONING COOPERATION AND DEALING WITH US NEEDS, WITH ALL DETAILS IN PROTOCOL FORM.

17. MOROKHOV MENTIONED DESIRABILITY OF AGREEMENT OF COOPERATION SETTING UP A JOINT COMMISSION TO MANAGE THE ACTIVITIES OF COOPERATION.

18. MOROKHOV MENTIONED IAEA PROCEEDINGS LAST WEEK ON UK PROPOSAL FOR PNE COMMITTEE. HE RECKONED THE PROPOSAL IS DEAD AND WAS VISIBLY PLEASED.

19. IN PRIVATE DOORWAY CONVERSATION TIMERBAEV EXERCISED BUCHHEIM FURTHER ABOUT DESIRABILITY OF STARTING ON SOME AGREEMENT DRAFTING, EVEN IF EVERYTHING IS IN BRACKETS EXCEPT THE NAMES OF THE PARTIES. HE ALSO REPEATED WHAT HAD BEEN SAID IN AN EARLIER PRIVATE MEETING, I.E., THAT US SIDE WAS FREE TO SAY ANYTHING IT

WISHED TO IN PLENARIES ABOUT OBSERVERS BUT SHOULD NOT EXPECT ANY
MEANINGFUL RESPONSE FROM THE SOVIET SIDE IN PLENARY.

20. ENTIRE MEETING WAS CORDIAL IN TONE.
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